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Scenario development for 2050 for the Israeli / Palestinian
water sector
Scenario analysis suggests that by 2050 the population of Israel,  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  will
grow from its current ten million to  between  14  and  28  million.  The  scenarios  developed  are
compared to available water resources and assessed for their viability. With all scenarios,  except
very  high  population  growth  in  the  context  of  inadequate  co-operation  between  Israel   and
Palestine, the water resource needs of the entire  population  can  be  met.  The  analysis  suggests
that water need not be an obstacle to peace or economic development in the region.
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Introduction
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are located between the Jordan River and the  Mediterranean
Sea. The West Bank and Gaza Strip (hereafter collectively referred to as Palestine), and Israel  are
very densely settled by global standards, having a higher population density  than  most  European
countries, and in the case of Palestine, average population density significantly exceeds that of  all
European Union states except Malta (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006). Because  approximately
half the land is arid and thus sparsely inhabited, effective population  densities  in  much  of  Israel
and Palestine are much higher than the average figures suggest.
Already Israel and Palestine have very low water  resources  availability  compared  to  the  global
average (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004). In the case  of  Palestine,  this  water  scarcity
directly impacts upon daily life and economic  activity  for  much  of  the  population.  With  rapid
population  growth  in  the   region   and   water   resources   already   inadequate,   the   long-term
hydrological future  of  region  appears  problematic.  Furthermore,  the  backdrop  of  the  Israeli-
Palestinian conflict hinders cooperation as  well  as  economic  and  social  development,  and  the
implementation of technical solutions to the region’s water crisis.
This  paper  assesses  what  are   the   long-term   implications,   in   relation   to   water   resources
management, of Israel  and  Palestine’s  expected  population  growth  by  developing  a  range  of
feasible scenarios of the  population  of  Israel  and  Palestine  for  the  year  2050.  They  are  then
examined in  relation  to  the  available  water  resources  to  ascertain  whether,  assuming  careful
management,  available  water  resources  will  be  sufficient,  and   what   types   of   management
structures need to be considered.
The growth rates of the population and the degree of water scarcity that Israel and Palestine face are not  unique,  with
serious problems of water scarcity projected to occur in an increasing number of countries in the coming decades. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, adds a very high degree of uncertainty to long term planning  in  the  region  and
suggests that that forecasting by the  simple  extrapolation  of  present  trends  may  be  inadequate.  In  addition,  it  is
questionable whether the status quo is such that future projections should be  based  on  it.  Equally,  the  hydrological
problems facing Israel and Palestine and the question of whether they are potentially manageable in the  long  term  is
of relevance elsewhere in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, given the extreme difficulties of  the  situation  in
Israel and Palestine, if the hydrological  problems  of  this  region  are  manageable,  it  would  suggest  that  optimism
elsewhere may also be warranted.
Population estimates of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza in 2050.
The area of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean is 26,990 sq km in area and  has
a population of approximately ten million  people  (Central  Intelligence  Agency,  2006).  Of  this
area, 20,770 sq km is in Israel, and 6,220 sq km is in Palestine. The current population of Israel  is
6.4 million, that of Palestine is 3.9 million  (Central  Intelligence  Agency,  2006);  the  population
growth rate for Israel is 1.2 percent per year and in Palestine it is 3.3 percent. Thus  it  is  expected
that the population of both countries will increase significantly in the coming decades.
According to the United Nations Population Division medium variant estimates, in the year  2025,
the population of Israel  will  be  8.6  million,  growing  to  10  million  by  2050  (United  Nations
Population Division, 2003). In Palestine, the population is expected to reach  6.9  million  in  2025
and  11.1  million  by  2050.  Therefore,  using  the  best  (medium)  estimates  of   the   U.N.,   the
population of the land between the Jordan  River  and  the  Mediterranean  will  be  approximately
21.1 million people in the year 2050, assuming normal immigration and emigration from the land,
and a decline in the fertility rates of the different  population  groups  similar  to  that  experienced
elsewhere in  the  world.  Under  the  high  variant  projection  of  the  United  Nations  Population
Division, population in Israel in 2050 is expected to reach 11.9 million, and  Palestine  13  million
(United Nations  Population  Division,  2003).  Under  the  low  variant  projection,  population  is
estimated to reach 8.3 million in Israel and 9.4 million in Palestine.
One factor that may have a significant effect on how the populations of Israel or Palestine grow over the coming
decades is the movement of Palestinian refugees. In 2003 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip there were more than 1.5
million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in
the Near East (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
2004). According to this agency in 2003 there were a further 2.5 million Palestinian refugees in
the Middle East who were not living in Israel or Palestine. Approximately 800,000 of these
refugees live in Syria or Lebanon and remain without citizenship, unlike the 1.7 million
Palestinians living in Jordan who have received citizenship. Like the Palestinian population living
in Palestine the population growth rate of these communities is high, with the total population of
refugees doubling over the last twenty years (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 2004). It is possible that as part of a peace settlement
between Israel and its neighbours some of these Palestinian refugees living abroad may return
either to Palestine or to Israel.
Immigration to Israel  from  Jewish  communities  elsewhere  has  significantly  increased  Israel’s
population  since  its  establishment  in  1948.  Since  1948  Israel  has   maintained   a   policy   of
unrestricted Jewish immigration. As a result of this policy (and other factors),  between  1948  and
2003, approximately 2.9 million people immigrated to Israel, 1.0 million of whom  arrived  during
the most recent wave of immigration between 1990 and 2000 (Israeli Central Bureau of  Statistics,
2003). Since 2000, immigration has significantly slowed. While  the  vast  majority  of  the  global
Jewish population will almost certainly remain in  the  Diaspora  in  the  foreseeable  future,  some
significant further immigration to Israel is  probable.  Accurately  quantifying  this  in  advance  is
impossible, but allowance for immigration based on past trends  is  already  incorporated  into  the
United Nations Population Division estimates.
The major factors, therefore, that  will  most  likely  determine  how  much  Israel  and  Palestine’s
population grows over the next two generations are the speed with which the fertility rates fall, the
movement of Palestinian refugees in the region, and the extent  of  Jewish  immigration  to  Israel.
On the basis of these factors, a number of population scenarios for 2050 are outlined below.
Scenarios for 2050
Table 1 outlines the various permutations possible for the scenarios for 2050 based upon  different
growth rates, migration patterns, and political structures.
The purpose of developing the scenarios is to identify the upper and lower bounds of the future population  in  Israel  /
Palestine in 2050, together with the most probable population. Therefore, in order  to  keep  the  number  of  scenarios
that are developed manageable, all scenarios, except the upper and lower bounds and the  medium  scenarios,  will  be
first assessed and then either dropped from further consideration or further explored where appropriate.
In terms of possible future political structures for Israel and Palestine, two scenarios are most probable, either that two
fully sovereign states are created (namely, Israel  and  Palestine),  or  that  a  single  bi-national  state  is  created.  The
creation of two fully sovereign states is similar to the model adopted in the former Czechoslovakia, where the Velvet
Revolution split the country into the Czech and Slovak Republics. A bi-national state is the  model
adopted by Belgium whereby only one sovereign state exists, but  there  are  two  distinct  national
communities with a high degree of autonomy in terms of how they run their affairs.
The option of a bi-national state to the west of the Jordan River  seems  unlikely  in  most  situations  as  a  bi-national
option is not supported at present by the Israeli government nor any of the major Israeli  political  parties,  nor  by  the
Palestinian Authority, nor the international community. This suggests that  a  single  bi-national  state  would  only  be
probable if a Palestinian majority was to occur in both the Palestinian state  and  in  the  Israeli  state,  thus  effectively
creating  two  Palestinians  states  which  may  then  choose  to  seek  closer  co-operation  than  is   possible   as   two
independent states and thus unite to form a single bi-national state.
A Palestinian majority occurring in Israel by 2050 is  only  likely  if  there  is  significant  Palestinian  immigration  to
Israel. Therefore, all bi-national  state  scenarios,  except  those  involving  Palestinian  immigration  to  Israel  can  be
dropped (scenarios A6,  B6,  C6,  A9,  B9,  C9,  A12,  B12,  and  C12).  The  scenarios  of  large  scale  movement  of
Palestinian refugees to Israel (scenarios A1, B1 and  C1),  all  likely  to  lead  to  a  Palestinian  majority  in  Israel  are
therefore effectively subsumed by scenarios A3, B3 and C3 since a bi-national state is the  most  likely  outcome  of  a
Palestinian majority in Israel. Scenarios A1, B1 and C1 can therefore be dropped.
The United Nations Population Division projections for  2050  assume  normal  migration  patterns,  based  upon  past
migration trends and the policy stances of national governments. The projections, therefore, already take into  account
expected Israeli / Jewish immigration to Israel, so scenarios that  specifically  factor  in  such  immigration  (scenarios
A4, A5, A6, B4, B5, B6, C4, C5, and C6) can be dropped since they are effectively doubling up the  effect  of  Jewish
immigration.
This paper is trying to establish upper and lower bounds for possible population scenarios for 2050, together  with  the
medium (most probable) scenario for 2050.  Therefore,  an  upper  limit  of  possible  population  growth  would  be  a
scenario  based  upon  the  high  population  projections  of  the  United  Nations  Population  Division,  together  with
significant  Palestinian  immigration.  On  this  basis,  scenarios  based  upon  Palestinian  immigration   occurring   in
conjunction with either medium  or  low  population  projections  can  be  dropped  (A1,  A2,  A3,  B1,  B2,  and  B3).
Similarly, scenarios  based  upon  Israeli  /  Palestinian  emigration  occurring  in  conjunction  with  medium  or  high
population growth can be dropped (scenarios A7,  A8,  C7  and  C8),  and  the  high  and  low  population  projections
together with no change in immigration / emigration can be dropped (B10, B11, C10, and C11.)
This leaves scenarios A10, A11, (medium population scenarios), B7 and B8 (lower  boundary  population  scenarios),
and C2 and C3 (upper boundary population scenarios). These scenarios are therefore explored in more detail below.
Medium population growth (A10 and A11)
These scenarios for 2050 are based upon population growth occurring in line with United  Nations
Population Division projections, with fertility rates falling as expected. They are also  based  upon
the assumption that there are no unexpected population movements into or out of region,  and  that
the boundary between Israel and Palestine is not altered. (In other words, the  border  between  the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestine) and Israel more or less follows the “Green  Line”,  although
minor border adjustments would likely occur as part of a peace settlement.) As such,  they  can  be
considered the most probable population scenarios based upon currently available information. On
this basis, the population in Israel would reach 10 million, and in Palestine 11.1 million.
Scenarios A10 and A11 will hereafter be referred to as Scenario A since they have the same basis.
Low population growth and significant net emigration  from  Israel  and  Palestine  (B7  and
B8)
These  scenarios  represent  the  lower  boundary  of  possible  population  growth   in   Israel   and
Palestine. They assume that the population growth in the region  matches  the  low  variant  of  the
United Nations Population Division projections. They also assume that net  migration  from  Israel
and Palestine over the 2004 –2050 period results in a twenty percent  reduction  of  the  total  final
population, and that there is no significant movement  of  refugees.  Assuming  that  the  boundary
between Israel and Palestine is not altered and no major population movement occurs between  the
two territories, then the population in Israel reach would  reach  6.6  million  and  in  Palestine  7.5
million.
Scenarios B7 and B8 will hereafter be referred to as Scenario B since they have the same basis.
High population growth and significant immigration of Palestinian refugees to Israel and Palestine (C2 and C3)
These scenarios represent the  upper  boundary  of  foreseeable  population  growth  in  Israel  and
Palestine. They assume that the population growth in the region matches  the  high  variant  of  the
United Nations Population Division projections. They also assume that the population growth rate
for the 800,000 Palestinian refugees currently living in  Syria  and  Lebanon  matches  that  of  the
Palestinian population  in  Palestine,  and  this  whole  population  migrates  to  Israel  /  Palestine,
resulting in an addition 3 million people living in the land to the west of the Jordan River in 2050.
Given their lack of citizenship, the Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon and Syria  are  the  most
likely to migrate to Israel or Palestine if  the  opportunity  arises.  Not  all  of  these  people  would
necessarily relocate to Israel or Palestine if given the option but might settle elsewhere.  However,
such non-returnees may  be  balanced  by  those  Palestinians  living  in  other  countries  (such  as
Jordan) who would chose to return to their homeland if given the option.
Assuming that all the refugees from Syria and Lebanon settle in Palestine only, and there is no movement of  refugees
to Israel, then in 2050 the population of Israel reaches 11.9 million, and that  of  Palestine  16  million  (scenario  C2).
Scenario C2 here after will be referred to as Scenario C.
Assuming that a bi-national state eventuates in the land to the west of the Jordan River, then the population of the area
reaches 27.9 million in 2050 (scenario C3). Scenario C3 here after will be referred to as Scenario D.
The population projections resulting from these scenarios are shown in Table 2.
The feasibility of the scenarios
Scenarios A to D all appear to be plausible given current growth rates and possible future political
developments in the region. Scenario A is the “business as usual scenario”, whereby fertility  rates
fall rapidly in-line with experiences elsewhere in the world and  there  are  no  sudden  unexpected
movements of population into or out of the region. Scenario B represents the lower  boundary  and
Scenarios C and D represent an upper bound of possible populations in  the  year  2050  for  Israel
and Palestine. Assessing which particular scenario is the most likely to  eventuate  is  not  possible
due to the extreme uncertainties  facing  the  Middle  East,  particularly  the  region  of  Israel  and
Palestine itself. Within the remit of this paper, this is also not necessary.
Scenarios C and D, while representing an upper boundary of the possible populations  of  Israel  and  Palestine  in  the
year 2050, are  still  plausible.  If  there  is  no  settlement  of  the  on-going  conflict  for  some  years,  thus  hindering
economic development in Palestine, then  fertility  rates  may  indeed  fall  more  slowly  than  expected.  The  present
political positions of a number of key players  in  the  region  suggest  that  the  large-scale  movement  of  Palestinian
refugees as part of a final peace settlement is probable. Hence, when (or perhaps if) a peace settlement in the region is
achieved, this may well result in a significant boost to the population of Israel, Palestine, or perhaps both countries.
Scenario B represents a lower boundary of likely population growth in  Israel  and  Palestine.  Such  a  scenario  could
occur if the current conflict continues (or intensifies) for many years to come and  forces  many  people  to  seek  lives
elsewhere due to the increasing economic and security difficulties that result.
All of the above scenarios, with the exception of scenario B in the case of Israel, envisage extremely  high  population
densities, much higher than those of the present.  Particularly  in  the  case  of  Palestine  with  scenario  C,  where  the
population density for the country as a whole would reach more than 2,500 people per square kilometre,  the  question
must be  asked  about  whether  this  is  physically  achievable.  However,  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  is
physically achievable, even if not desirable.
The population density of the Tel Aviv district contains 1.2 million people in an area  of  171  sq,  km.,  thus  giving  a
population density around 7,000 people per sq. km (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The  current
population density of the Gaza Strip  as  a  whole  averages  more  than  3,500  people  per  square
kilometre.  Further  more,  the  Palestinian  built  up  area  covers  just  53.7   sq   km   (Palestinian
Academic  Society  for  the  Study  of  International  Affairs,  2003).  With  94.7   percent   of   the
population in the Gaza Strip living in urban areas or camps (Palestinian Academic Society for  the
Study of International Affairs, 2003), the population density  in  built  up  areas  is  around  22,000
people per sq. km.
While it is hardly desirable to emulate the overcrowded and poor living conditions that exist  in  much  of  Gaza,  it  is
clear that extremely high densities already exist in specific parts of  the  region.  However,  such  population  densities
also require a  conceptual  reassessment  in  that  the  area  should  not  be  seen  as  a  predominantly  rural  hinterland
supplying a few urban centres, but, instead, as an urban conglomerate whose existence depend on  infrastructure  links
with a much wider hinterland than hitherto conceptualised.  In  this  case,  Gaza,  for  instance,  may  benefit  from  an
analysis as a poorly equipped mega-city. Either  way,  the  essentially  urban  nature  of  many  areas  also  affects  the
viability of the political solutions as well.
Available Water Resources
Both surface water and groundwater are available in the land  between  the  Jordan  River  and  the
Mediterranean. In terms of fresh water supply, the major groundwater  sources  are  the  Mountain
Aquifer, which can be divided into three sub-basins  (Western  Mountain  Aquifer,  North-Eastern
Mountain  Aquifer,  and  Eastern  Mountain  Aquifer),  as  well   as   the   Coastal   Aquifer   (U.S.
Geological Survey, 1998). Both the Western Mountain Aquifer and  the  North-Eastern  Mountain
Aquifer are shared water resources, being located in  both  the  West  Bank  and  Israel,  while  the
Eastern Mountain Aquifer is located entirely within the West Bank. The Coastal Aquifer underlies
the Coastal Plain of Israel and the Gaza Strip. The only major surface water resource in the  region
is the Jordan River system, shared by Israel,  the  West  Bank,  Lebanon,  Syria  and  Jordan.  (See
Figure 1 for a map of the study area and its water resources.)
Estimates of the available renewable water resources of Israel and Palestine vary. According to data published  by  the
Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructures, the total average annual potential volume of renewable water  available  is
1,800 MCM (Ministry of National Infrastructure, 2002).  This  figure  is  broken  down  according  to
source in Table 3.  According  to  data  published  by  the  Palestinian  Water  Authority,  the  total
volume  of  available  renewable  water  resources  is  2634  MCM  (Palestinian  Water  Authority,
2004). This figure is broken down according to source in Table 4.
The values given in Tables 3 and 4 are significantly different. However, the  figures  given  by  the  Palestinian  Water
Authority for the Mountain Aquifer match those agreed upon  and  specified  in  the  Israeli-Palestinian  Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the Oslo 2 Agreement) signed  in  1995,  suggesting
that  the  figures  for  this  aquifer  are  likely  to  be  reasonably  accurate  or  at   least   politically
acceptable to both sides.
Resolving the discrepancies in data
There is no agreed publicly accessible database relating to water resources and their  use  in  Israel
and Palestine (Rouyer, 2000). While Israel has developed  its  own  detailed  database,  Palestinian
water experts question the accuracy of  officially  released  data  since  access  to  the  raw  data  is
generally not permitted (Rouyer, 2000). Furthermore, as argued by Alatout  (2000),  water  data  is
always subject to bias. Even the most objective Israeli or Palestinian scientist or analyst  will  tend
to produce figures that favour the position of their nation;  scientific  knowledge  is  itself  socially
constructed and is thus influenced by  the  cultural,  institutional  and  historical  conditions  of  its
production (Alatout, 2000).
Since water resources are generally being fully used (or in some cases overused)  in  the  region  (U.S.  Geological
Survey, 1998), data on water production and consumption can  give  some  indication  of  resource
availability although the reliability of this data is also open to  question.  During  the  ten  years  to
2001, total water production in Israel (excluding wastewater reuse) averaged 1785 MCM per  year
(Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, various years).  Palestinian  water  use  is  approximately  271
MCM per  year  (Palestinian  Water  Authority,  2004).  However,  the  aquifer  in  Gaza  is  being
overdrawn at a rate of approximately 87  MCM  per  year,  and  the  Eastern  Mountain  aquifer  is
thought to be under exploited by 78 MCM, thus suggesting that the sustainable yield of  the  water
resources  currently  available  for  Palestinian  use  is  262  MCM  per   year   (Palestinian   Water
Authority, 2004).
These usage figures therefore suggest that the total annual renewable water resource  of  the  land  to  the  west  of  the
Jordan River is approximately 2047 MCM. The above usage data (if accurate) suggests that of this 2047 MCM,  1785
MCM is currently exploited by Israel and 262 could potentially be exploited sustainably by the Palestinian population
of the West Bank and Gaza.
Given that the Jordan River, which makes up 30 to 40 percent of this total, is a water resource shared by other riparian
states with whom there is no water sharing agreement (namely  Syria  and  Lebanon)  the  long  term  supply  of  2047
MCM  to  Israel  and  Palestine  is  not  guaranteed.  Furthermore,   with   the   aquifer   under   Gaza   being   depleted
unsustainably, a further 50 MCM of supply is likely to be lost. However, given that  2000  MCM  is  the  approximate
quantity of sustainable annual water supply currently available (excluding the overexploited and thus degrading  Gaza
Coastal Aquifer), this figure will be used here in the discussion. It will be assumed that the approximate  quantities  of
water available from the different sources are  300  MCM  from  the  Coastal  Aquifer,  172  MCM  from  the  Eastern
Mountain Aquifer, 145 MCM from the  North-Eastern  Mountain  Aquifer,  362  MCM  from  the  Western  Mountain
Aquifer, 700 MCM from the Jordan River system, and 321 MCM from other  sources  found  entirely  within  Israel’s
borders, such as surface runoff and a number of small aquifer such  as  the  Western  Galilee  Aquifer.  The  Mountain
Aquifer is the highest quality water source in the region.
At present there is no final  agreement  between  Israel  and  Palestine  on  water  issues,  with  water  being  discussed
without resolution during the final negotiations between the two  sides  as  part  of  the  Peace  Process  of  the  1990s.
However, given the importance of a secure water supply for human health and national development, it  is  imperative
that some sort of water sharing agreement that is grounded in international law be reached in the  near  future,  though
this will probably have to await some sort of peace settlement.
Cross boundary water resources management
It is reasonably clear under international law that Israel and Palestine are expected to co-operate in
their use of their shared water resources, for both groundwater  and  surface  water,  although  how
precisely the two nations should manage their shared resources is not specified.
The Jordan River borders the West Bank  before  it  flows  into  the  Dead  Sea  and  thus  as  a  riparian  to  this  river,
Palestine has riparian rights to a portion of its flow under  international  water  law  just  as  Israel  has  riparian  rights
because of a portion of the river basin lies within its territory. The Eastern Mountain  Aquifer  lies  wholly  within  the
West Bank and  so  is  not  a  shared  water  resource.  With  the  North-Eastern  Mountain  Aquifer  and  the  Western
Mountain Aquifer, however, while the majority of the recharge zones lie within the West Bank,  much  of  the  natural
discharge area lies within Israeli territory. This allowed Israel to exploit part of the aquifer’s potential even prior to its
occupation of the West Bank (Trottier, 1999). Thus both of these aquifers  are  shared  water  resources.
The Coastal Aquifer is also a shared water resource since there is some east-west flow through the
aquifer towards the Mediterranean (U.S. Geological Survey, 1998).
The population projections raise the fundamental question of whether there is sufficient water available to meet  likely
demand  in  Israel  and  Palestine.  On  the  basis  of  food  self  sufficiency  (in  the  context  of  sub-Saharan   Africa)
Falkenmark (1986) proposed a water scarcity index, whereby a  country  with  less  than  1000  cubic
metres of  water  per  capita  is  suffering  water  scarcity  where  water  shortages  would  threaten
economic development and human health and well-being. This benchmark figure  has  since  been
widely accepted as an indication of when a country faces water scarcity since approximately  1000
cubic metres of water per capita per year is required  for  food  production,  either  in  the  form  of
irrigation water or naturally occurring soil water (Allan, 1997).
Allan (1997) argues that the Middle East  was  the  first  major  region  of  the  world  to  run  out  of
water, with most of the countries of the region gradually developing  water  deficits  over  the  last
few decades; Israel, for example, ran out of water in the 1950s. As countries have developed water
deficits the shortfall in available water compared to  the  quantity  required  to  maintain  food  self
sufficiency has been met by food imports, primarily, the import of low value  grains  from  Europe
and North America (Allan, 1997). Allan (1997) terms this trade in grains as “virtual  water”  since
water is effectively embedded in such water intensive commodities, with such food imports  being
available  in  non-affluent  countries.  Given  widespread  participation  in  global   food   markets,
questions of food self-sufficiency can only  realistically  be  assessed  at  the  global  level  (Allan,
2001);  hence  assessing  the  adequacy  of  a  nation’s  water  supply  on  the  basis  of   food   self
sufficiency is of doubtful validity.
Shuval (1992) suggests  a  figure  of  125  cubic  metres  per  capita  per  year  as  a  minimum  water
requirement which incorporates domestic needs as well as modest industrial and gardening  needs.
While the WHO / UNICEF (2000) adopted the much lower figure of 7.3  cubic  metres  per  capita
per year (20 litres per capita per day) this figure serves as an absolute global  minimum  for  water
supply and only makes allowance for very basic domestic needs. Domestic water  consumption  in
all developed countries is far higher than this figure, and this figure  makes  no  allowance  for  the
water requirements for maintaining a non-agricultural economy (Feitelson  &  Chenoweth,  2002).
The  figure  of  125  cubic  metres  per  capita  per  year   provides   an   indication   of   the   water
requirements for maintaining a modern industrial /  service  based  economy.  It  also  provides  an
indication of the water  required  for  household-based  food  production  during  a  transition  to  a
modern industrial-service economy.
The readily available natural fresh water resources of a country no  longer  limit  fresh  water  supply.  Water  imports
from elsewhere (such as Turkey) are possible but desalination is also of growing importance as costs have  fallen.  For
example, the cost of water agreed upon recently for a new  desalination  plant  in  southern  Israel  was  $US0.527  per
cubic metre of water, with the plant to produce 100 million cubic metres of fresh water per  year  from  Mediterranean
water (Lokiec & Kronenberg, 2003). Desalination requires ready access to a source of saline  water
and so is a potential option for the Gaza Strip and Israel but not the West Bank.
While the cost of desalinating seawater is slowly falling, the current cost of producing desalinated seawater is  similar
to  the  cost  of  water  provided  to  Israeli  consumers,  which  are  uniform  across  the  country   (Kislev,   2002).
Residential users in Israel pay between $US0.61 and $US1.27  per  cubic  metre,  depending  upon
the quantity consumed (Kislev, 2002). While these prices are higher than the price  of  desalinated
water, the current desalination price of $US0.57 does not include distribution  costs.  Desalination,
therefore, even without significant further cost reductions is clearly able to meet  urban,  and  to  a
lesser extent, industrial water  requirements  for  Israel  and  Palestine  if  domestic  and  industrial
demands for water exceed the natural renewable fresh water resources. However, due  to  the  high
energy  requirements  of  desalination  compared  to  the   cost   of   accessing   surface   water   or
groundwater from the aquifers, it is unlikely  that  desalination  will  ever  be  able  to  be  used  to
support agriculture within the foreseeable future.
Water Management options for Israel and Palestine
There are a number of possibilities for managing the shared water resources of Israel and Palestine
and achieving an equitable allocation of water  resources  between  the  two  nations.  It  would  be
possible to jointly manage the water resources of Israel and Palestine. With 2000  MCM  per  year
of  water  available  from  renewable  natural  sources,  desalination  and  /   or   the   recycling   of
wastewater could make up any shortfall. Haddad et al (1999) argue that due  to  the  high  level  of
hydrological interdependence between Israel and Palestine, and the susceptibility  of  the  aquifers
to degradation, integrated management as a single system is required. Haddad et al (1999) explore
various mechanisms for joint management of the shared aquifers of Israel and Palestine.
Integrated  management   would   require   extensive   co-operation   between   Israel   and   Palestine,   including   the
establishment of a joint water authority to manage and  distribute  the  available  resources.  Because  of  this  and  the
associated loss of sovereignty it would entail, it is uncertain whether such a solution could be  achieved.  Furthermore,
with more rapid population growth occurring in Palestine than in Israel, the Israeli government may  prefer  to  seek  a
permanent water resources division at the time of a peace settlement rather than see its own allocation  slowly  eroded
overtime as  its  percentage  of  the  population  of  the  region  slowly  decreases.  From  the  Palestinian  perspective,
Palestinian negotiators to a peace settlement may also prefer a fixed allocation of the resource  rather  than  depending
upon the future success of joint management processes.
Dividing the water resources would provide both  nations  with  the  much  greater  autonomy  in  terms  of  how  they
develop, though with Lake Tiberias and the majority of the storage capacity of the Mountain Aquifer located in Israeli
territory, little inter-annual storage would be available to Palestine. Also, the Northern West Bank  is  relatively  water
rich, and the southern West Bank and Gaza is relatively water  poor,  but  there  is  no  north-south  water  conveyance
network within Palestine similar to what presently exists within Israel. Furthermore, sustainably managing an  aquifer
at maximum sustainable yield is difficult to achieve with a single management  authority  but  is  even  more  difficult
with a jointly managed resource. Therefore, if separate management was chosen, there would still be a need for a joint
monitoring body and some level of co-operation.
Assuming that a division of the water resources was chosen with the creation of two separate water networks in mind,
then Palestine could be expected to claim full sovereign control over the Eastern Mountain Aquifer  (172  MCM)  and
thus seek to exclude this from negotiations. Israel could be expected make a similar claim with respect  to  sources  of
water resources located entirely within Israel (321 MCM). It might also make a similar claim  to  the  Coastal  Aquifer
since the east-west flow of this  aquifer  from  Israel  into  Gaza  is  limited  and  most  of  the  aquifer’s  recharge  and
discharge area is located to the north, wholly within Israeli territory. Furthermore, with the on-going over-exploitation
of the Gazan portion of the Coastal Aquifer likely to permanently degrade  the  aquifer,  its  shared  status  with  Israel
may become a mute point since the aquifer under Gaza will effectively cease to exist.
One readily conceivable division would be to give  Palestine  first  right  of  use  to  the  Mountain
Aquifer but no use of the Jordan River system or  water  from  the  Israeli  portion  of  the  Coastal
Aquifer. Such a division of water resources would provide Palestine with access to  679  MCM  of
water, and Israel 1,321 MCM. This split would effectively give priority  to  the  upper  riparian  of
each water resource, with any un-used allocation becoming available for  use  by  the  other  party.
However, because much of the inter-annual storage area of the Mountain Aquifer underlies  Israeli
territory, Palestine would not be able to fully exploit the  resource  without  Israeli  assistance.  An
alternative  division  of  the  water  resources  may  be  to  divide  the  Mountain  Aquifer  and  the
available water from the Jordan River system equally between the Israel and Palestine. This would
provide Palestine with 690 MCM of water, and Israel 1310 MCM.
Both of these divisions result in a similar gross water distribution and would double the amount of
water available to Palestine compared to the present  level.  It  would  also  divide  the  total  water
resources west of the Jordan River at a ratio roughly similar to the current population ratio, thus in
this sense could be seen as equitable. However, it would do little to solve  the  water  problems  of
the Gaza Strip without Israeli willingness to facilitate a water  transfer  through  its  territory  from
the West Bank, or without the use of desalination. The discussion below considers  the  population
scenarios A to D in  relation  to  the  first  of  these  resources  divisions,  although  given  that  the
volumes of water are similar, the result would be similar for either.
The hydrological viability of Israel and Palestine under population scenarios A to D
Scenario A: Israel: 10 million; Palestine: 11.1 million, medium population growth.
Under this scenario there would be sufficient water available in Israel to meet urban and industrial
needs, although severe cuts to the  amount  of  freshwater  going  to  Israeli  agriculture  would  be
required as per capita water resources for Israel would fall to 132 cubic metres per capita. Some of
this could  be  replaced  by  recycled  wastewater  from  urban  areas  that  would  be  available  in
increasing quantities.
In Palestine, the available freshwater would  be  insufficient  for  developing  a  modern  industrial
economy or a high standard of living. However, the water resources available to Palestine  located
in the West Bank would approximately cover Palestinian needs in  the  West  Bank.  Despite  this,
due to inter-annual climatic variation, the water situation in the  West  Bank  would  be  somewhat
precarious and might require the  purchase  of  water  from  outside  in  drier  years  or  the  use  of
recycled wastewater for some industrial or domestic needs.
In Gaza, water requirements would need to be met by desalination or water  imports  from  outside
the region.  Since  the  Gazan  population  is  located  close  to  the  Mediterranean  and  thus  little
pumping would be required, supply costs of such water would  not  add  significantly  to  the  total
cost of this water.
Under this scenario, large quantities of wastewater would be produced in the Gaza  Strip  but  with
the extremely high population density of the  Gaza  Strip,  potential  for  agricultural  uses  of  this
water would be limited. This might permit a water trade with Israel, whereby wastewater from the
Gaza Strip might be exchanged for the  supply  of  freshwater.  Such  a  trade  could  be  used,  for
example, to alleviate any shortfall in freshwater supply for domestic and industrial use in the West
Bank in years of below average rainfall, or reduce the quantity of water Gaza would be required to
desalinate.
If a joint  integrated  water  resources  system  was  created  for  Israel  and  Palestine,  then  three-
quarters of the region’s domestic and industrial needs could be  met  from  natural  water  sources,
with the remaining water (approximately 650 MCM) coming from  desalination  plants  along  the
Mediterranean. Such an amount is certainly conceivable given that the Israeli government in  2002
published tenders for desalination plants totalling 305 MCM per year (Israeli Ministry  of  Foreign
Affairs,  2002).  From  a  resource  management  and  environmental  perspective,  this  integrated
management  solution  for  this  scenario  would  be  the   optimum   since   the   total   amount   of
desalination in the region could be kept to a minimum  and  water  could  allocated  purely  on  the
basis of domestic need.
Scenario A represents the most likely situation if the current status quo is maintained  in  terms  of
expected population growth rates and migration. The above analysis is based upon the  first  water
redistribution considered in the previous section. If, however, there  is  no  change  to  the  present
water resources distribution between Israel and Palestine, then water resources by 2050  would  be
even more inadequate for the Palestinian population than at present. Only 23 cubic metre of  water
per capita would be available, a mere third  of  what  is  available  today.  Such  a  situation  would
produce a humanitarian disaster.
Scenario  B:  Israel:  6.6  million;  Palestine:  7.5  million,  low  population  growth   and   net
emigration from both areas
Israel would suffer a reduction in its water  resources  per  capita  compared  today,  but  its  water
resources would remain comfortably above 125 cubic metres per capita. Thus it would be  capable
of maintaining reserve for times of drought and for use in agriculture.
In Palestine, in the West Bank, water resources would also comfortably  remain  above  125  cubic
metres per capita, thus also allowing some limited use of fresh water for  agriculture.  In  Gaza,  as
with scenario A, desalination would be  required.  However,  given  the  surplus  (from  urban  and
industrial needs at least) in the West Bank, there would be  a  real  possibility  of  a  water  transfer
from the West Bank via Israel. Similarly, the purchase of fresh water from Israel might  also  be  a
possibility. If good neighbourly relations were established an arrangement whereby  Israel  was  to
supply some  of  its  freshwater  to  Gaza  for  domestic  purposes  in  return  for  receiving  treated
wastewater for use in agriculture might work  to  the  benefit  of  both  sides.  A  single  integrated
system  would  facilitate  such  an  arrangement  and  allow  optimum  management  of  the   water
resources.
Scenario  C:  Israel:  11.9  million;  Palestine:   16   million,   high   growth   and   Palestinian
immigration
Israel  would  require  modest  desalination  capacity  to  supplement  its  available  natural   water
resources in order to meet its urban and industrial water requirements. However,  in  Palestine  the
situation would be difficult. Only half of  the  water  requirements  of  the  West  Bank  population
would be able to be met from Mountain Aquifer. Unless several hundred MCM of water could  be
purchased from outside sources, water resources per capita in the West Bank would be lower  than
at present and thus the population would probably suffer considerable hardship. If  water  was  not
imported then it is probable that the Mountain Aquifer would become  degraded  through  overuse
further reducing water resources, and a large scale emigration of people (environmental  refugees)
could result. In Gaza, as with scenarios A and B, large-scale desalination would be required.
The severe water problems Palestine would face under this scenario might be avoided  if  a  single
integrated water system was established for Israel  and  Palestine.  Since  this  would  be  of  much
greater benefit to Palestine than Israel, reaching agreement on such a  management  system  might
be difficult. However, if agreement on an integrated system was  not  reached  then  water  trading
between Israel and Palestine would hopefully still occur.
Scenario D: Bi-national state: 27.9 million, high growth and Palestinian Immigration
A bi-national state would  almost  certainly  result  in  a  single  integrated  water  system.  With  a
population of 27.9 million, significant desalination would be required to supplement natural water
resources, with approximately 1,500 MCM being required to be produced each year. The  need  to
pump significant quantities of water from low lying coastal areas to the hill  country  of  the  West
Bank would add to water supply costs. The integrated network and bi-national nature of  the  state,
however, would permit cross subsidisation by coastal areas,  as  currently  occurs  in  Israel  today.
With real economic growth and falling  desalination  costs,  water  might  be  less  expensive  than
today for most domestic consumers in real terms.
The large population would produce similarly large quantities of wastewater. With treatment,  this
would provide a significant resource for use in agriculture. Available land  areas  would  likely  be
limited, however, due to the large population. Nonetheless,  some  areas  of  potential  agricultural
land would probably remain in the Negev Desert, and where such areas did not overlie any aquifer
recharge areas, wastewater treatment costs would be minimal.
Table 5 presents data relating to scenarios A to D.
Discussion and conclusion
It is imperative that a fairer distribution of the water resources of Israel and Palestine  be  achieved
if an environmental and human disaster (in relation to water resources) is to be avoided.  If  this  is
achieved,  then  it  appears  that  there  are  realistic  management  options  that  would  allow   the
hydrological needs of the populations of Israel and Palestine  to  be  met.   Water  need  not  be  an
obstacle to peace or economic development in the region.
By 2050  under  all  scenarios  considered  in  this  paper,  except  the  low  population  growth  of
scenario B, the population of Israel and Palestine  will  increase  significantly,  probably  to  levels
that are difficult to conceive based on present populations. The already high population density  of
the land, the lack of significant water resources relative to population,  and  the  on-going  conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians, suggest that many real challenges lie ahead. However, with all
scenarios, except the high population growth of scenario C occurring in the context  of  inadequate
co-operation,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  domestic  and  industrial  water  resource  needs  of  the
population will  be  met  if  good  management  occurs.  This  finding  is  perhaps  contrary  to  the
common wisdom relating to water resources in Israel, Palestine or the wider  Middle  East,  which
sees water as a major  impediment  to  a  peaceful  or  prosperous  future,  and  sees  the  world  as
heading towards a major hydrological crisis.
Only in the case of scenario B for Israel is any significant quantity of fresh water likely  to  remain
for use in agriculture. In every scenario for Palestine recycled wastewater is likely  to  become  the
only agricultural water source, and there will be little space for agriculture anyway as urban  areas
come to dominate the Palestinian landscape. The continued decline of agriculture in Israel will  be
unlikely to present any insurmountable challenges as agriculture in Israel  is  already  insignificant
(less than 3 percent) in terms of its contribution to GDP  or  employment.  In  Palestine,  however,
achieving  rapid  economic  development  in  the  absence   of   a   significant   contribution   from
agriculture will present a major challenge  for  the  Palestinian  government  and  the  international
donor community.
For all the scenarios an integrated water resources system to manage the water resources  of  Israel
and Palestine as a single unit is preferable from a water resources  management  perspective.  This
would also result in the lowest  overall  net  economic  and  environmental  cost  since  the  use  of
desalination would be able to be minimised. However, where a much larger Palestinian population
relative to the Israeli population occurs, it is difficult to imagine such a solution  being  acceptable
politically in Israel since Israel might be worse off than with separate management.
Even without a  fully  integrated  water  resources  system,  there  is  significant  potential  for  the
trading of water resources between Israel and Palestine. In particular,  the  large  urban  population
of Gaza will produce considerable quantities of wastewater whose potential use in the  Gaza  Strip
will be limited (due to space limitations) but this water could be productively used for  agriculture
in the adjacent Negev Desert of Israel. At the same time, the West Bank  will  possibly  have  need
of additional quantities of freshwater to meet its basic  domestic  and  industrial  requirements  but
unlike Israel, lacks access to the sea for desalination, so in some situations there may be a need for
Israel to supply water produced in its Mediterranean desalination plants.
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Tables and Figures:
Table 1: Basis of scenarios for population in Israel and Palestine in 2050.
|            |                    |Population growth           |
|            |                    |Medium   |Low      |High     |
|Palestinian |To Israel           |A1       |B1       |C1       |
|immigration |                    |         |         |         |
|            |To Palestine        |A2       |B2       |C2       |
|            |To bi-national state|A3       |B3       |C3       |
|Jewish      |To Israel           |A4       |B4       |C4       |
|immigration |                    |         |         |         |
|            |To Palestine        |A5       |B5       |C5       |
|            |To bi-national state|A6       |B6       |C6       |
|Israeli /   |From Israel         |A7       |B7       |C7       |
|Palestinian |                    |         |         |         |
|emigration  |                    |         |         |         |
|            |From Palestine      |A8       |B8       |C8       |
|            |From bi-national    |A9       |B9       |C9       |
|            |state               |         |         |         |
|No change in|From Israel         |A10      |B10      |C10      |
|immigration |                    |         |         |         |
|/ emigration|                    |         |         |         |
|            |From Palestine      |A11      |B11      |C11      |
|            |From bi-national    |A12      |B12      |C12      |
|            |state               |         |         |         |
Table 2: Population projects, resulting population density and resulting water resources per capita
(assuming no redistribution of resource or  augmentation  through  desalination)  for  the  different
scenarios.
|Scenario|Geographic area|Population  |Population      |
|        |               |(millions)  |density (persons|
|        |               |            |/km2)           |
|Current |Israel         |6.4         |306             |
|situatio|               |            |                |
|n       |               |            |                |
|        |Palestine      |3.9         |625             |
|A       |Israel         |10          |481             |
|        |Palestine      |11.1        |1785            |
|B       |Israel         |6.6         |318             |
|        |Palestine      |7.5         |1206            |
|C       |Israel         |11.9        |573             |
|        |Palestine      |16          |2572            |
|D       |Bi-national    |27.9        |1034            |
|        |state          |            |                |
Table 3: Available renewable water according to source in Israel / Palestine (Israeli data).
(Source: Ministry of National Infrastructure, 2002).
|Resource                 |Renewable water|
|                         |(MCM/year)     |
|Coastal Aquifer          |320            |
|Mountain Aquifer         |370            |
|Lake Tiberias / Jordan   |700            |
|River                    |               |
|Other sources            |410            |
|Total                    |1,800          |
Table 4: Available renewable water by source in Israel / Palestine (Palestinian data).
(Source: Palestinian Water Authority, 2004)
|Resource                             |Renewable water (MCM /    |
|                                     |year)                     |
|Groundwater total                    |1454                      |
|including:                           |                          |
|              |Eastern Mountain     |172       |679            |
|Mountain      |Aquifer              |          |               |
|aquifer       |                     |          |               |
|              |North-eastern        |145       |               |
|              |Mountain Aquifer     |          |               |
|              |Western Mountain     |362       |               |
|              |Aquifer              |          |               |
|       Coastal|Coastal Aquifer      |254       |304            |
|aquifer       |                     |          |               |
|              |Gaza portion of      |50        |               |
|              |aquifer              |          |               |
|Jordan River                         |          |965            |
|Runoff                               |          |215            |
|Total                                |          |2634           |
Table 5: Summary of scenarios A to D
|Scenario|Geographic|Populatio|Populatio|Water Resources based |
|        |area      |n        |n density|upon hypothesised     |
|        |          |(millions|(persons |water resource        |
|        |          |)        |/sq km)  |division (cubic metres|
|        |          |         |         |per capita)           |
|Current |Israel    |6.1      |306      |281a                  |
|situatio|          |         |         |                      |
|n       |          |         |         |                      |
|        |Palestine |3.5      |625      |67 a                  |
|A       |Israel    |10       |481      |132                   |
|        |Palestine |11.1     |1785     |61                    |
|B       |Israel    |6.6      |318      |200                   |
|        |Palestine |7.5      |1206     |91                    |
|C       |Israel    |11.9     |573      |111                   |
|        |Palestine |16       |2572     |42                    |
|D       |Bi-nationa|27.9     |1034     |72                    |
|        |l state   |         |         |                      |
Note:    a: with current water resources division
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Figure 1: A map of the study area, showing approximate locations of the shared aquifers and surface water resources.
